

I appreciate Professor Del Pero's careful review and generous assessment of my book. Let me reply to his main objections. First, he suggests the book aims to cover so much terrain that it inevitably appears impressionistic at times. I must agree. Doing a history of the entire world for a decade in a fully comprehensive fashion is not possible in a book of any reasonable length. There is simply too much history to include. So my argument in **The 1970s** necessarily focuses on certain overarching themes that provide a new way of thinking about the course of that decade, particularly the changes in U.S. political culture that were part of a broader, global shift in assumptions about politics, about human equality, and about the organization of political economy. My book offers a great deal of very concrete evidence for the themes it develops, so I would not use the word "impressionistic" myself to describe it, but I do understand how it might seem that way--in particular to a reader in Western Europe, which unfortunately receives relatively little attention in the book's arguments.

Professor Del Pero suggests, second, that emphasizing the distinctive, disruptive features of the 1970s leads to an inadequate emphasis on continuities across the surrounding decades. The *longue durée*, in other words, may be more important than the particular changes of this decade, with various processes such as suburbanization both preceding and succeeding these few years. This is a challenging question, since how we answer this depends on the evidence we use--what criteria are most "important"? I will grant that many processes and themes can be seen as extending long before and long after the 1970s, and I do not question their significance. But my book examines the very definitive ruptures and changes that unfolded between 1973 and 1979, both in the United States and around the world, and makes what I believe is a compelling argument for how these changes radically altered the terms of political debate and assumptions about human equality and market economics, both in the United States and abroad. The evidence for this shift occupies the 300 pages of the book, and I urge readers to examine this evidence themselves. Even the *longue durée* has its chronology and its periodization, and in the case of the twentieth century, I think there is little doubt that the 1970s marks a key shift in economics, politics, and culture in the United States and in a surprisingly large number of other important countries and regions. This decade was, simply, a turning point.

Professor Del Pero's third criticism is the most important: that **The 1970s** is not really a true global history. In most ways, I agree. I lost a battle with my excellent publisher over the title and subtitle of the book, which I had originally called "More Equal, Less Equal: The United States and the World in the 1970s." Princeton University Press preferred a simpler title and wanted the word "global" in the subtitle to signal to its mostly American readers that the book placed U.S. history in a global context. And that is precisely the point: the book is a history of the United States during the 1970s, set in its international context. The book aims to overcome the tendency in U.S. history to write as though the nation were exceptional and separated from other nations--which, of course, it is not and never has been. So I tracked the trends of growing social egalitarianism and increasing emphasis on market economics (with its resulting rising economic inequality) that marked the United States in this decade, and I then surveyed world history in the same years and discovered very similar trends. The book, then, has two purposes: to explain U.S. history in the 1970s, and to place that history in the broader history of the world in the same years. It aims to contribute to an ongoing historiographical effort to force reexamination of assumptions of "American exceptionalism."

Methodologically, to the extent that the book deals with world history (particularly in chapters 4 and 5, for example), it operates more as a comparative history than as a history of international relations. World history can, in brief, be understood as focusing on one or the other of these two approaches: connections between nation or areas, or comparisons between them. While most of my earlier scholarship has been on connections ("U.S. international history"), this book included

some of that but emphasized instead the question of how patterns in the United States fit with or deviated from patterns across the globe in the same era. I think, then, that Professor Del Pero and I ultimately see in very similar terms what *The 1970s* does and does not do.

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