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According to the traditional interpretations of the Cold War as a bipolar, systemic conflict between rival world powers for hegemony or a certain balance of power¹, it seemed self-evident to focus on classical nation-state diplomacy, international politics, and economics. Therefore, for a quite long period, historical research on the Cold War concentrated on traditional subjects, such as the relationship between hegemonic powers and their political and military alliances, military build-ups, conflict scenarios, political conferences, and the like². As the Cold War was an international conflict, the research schedule had to be international as well. Furthermore, this approach favored an interpretational scheme that allowed the analysis of nation-state policies within this international framework without ever questioning the importance of the nation state. Only recently has scholarship shifted to other approaches and, thus, to different questions and fields of research, especially the elements of ideology³, culture, and propaganda⁴. Moreover, the Cold War has been reinterpreted as a conflict *sui generis*, primarily involving transnational⁵ elements. Thus, the Cold War is now interpreted as a conflict between

1 Cf. B. W. Kubbig, *Between Self-Restraint and "All Options Open": Positioning the US Hegemon in the Democratic/Non-Democratic Divide*, in «Amerikastudien», No. 46, 2001, pp. 661-86; see R. Witzel, *Blueprints of American Global Policy since 1945*, ivi, pp. 525-34.

2 R. E. Powalski, *The Cold War: The United States and the Soviet Union, 1917-1981*, New York, 1998.

3 A. Iriye, *Culture and International History*, in M. J. Hogan and T. G. Paterson, eds., *Explaining the History of American Foreign Relations*, New York, Cambridge University Press, 1991, pp. 214-26.

4 W. L. Hixson, *Parting the Curtain: Propaganda, Culture, and the Cold War, 1945-1961*, New York, St. Martin's Press, 1997; B. J. Gary, *The Nervous Liberals: Propaganda Anxieties from World War I to the Cold War*, New York, Macmillan, 1999; S. J. Whitfield, *The Culture of the Cold War*, Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1991; F. Schumacher, *Kalter Krieg und Propaganda: Die USA, der Kampf um die Weltmeinung und die ideelle Westbindung der Bundesrepublik, 1945-1955*, Trier, Wissenschaftlicher Verlag, 2000.

5 On the concept of transnationality cfr. T. Risse-Kappen, (ed.), *Bringing Transnational Relations Back In: Non-State Actors, Domestic Structures, and International Institutions*, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1995.

rivaling system of societal order dealing with differing modes of modernization and different ways of overcoming modernization crises. In this article, I want to deal with some cultural elements of the Cold War and their specific place within the broader framework of transnational conflict. In order to do so, I will first give a short introduction into the various fields of Cold War research and the major problems they raise. Thereby, I want to integrate culturalist and transnationalist approaches into the more classical ways of dealing with the Cold War. In a second step, I want to give some examples of the great significance of transnational cultural efforts during the Cold War⁶.

In the very beginning of Cold War history we find three differing, yet intertwined interpretative approaches, each of them offering a multitude of their own opportunities and problems. The first stressed the central importance of military and political factors in the then ongoing conflict. It correctly applied the traditional methods of diplomatic history between nation states in the classical mode of the nineteenth and early twentieth century to the new conflict between the United States of America, the Soviet Union, and their several allies. It focussed on institutional aspects and on persons involved in decision-making processes⁷. This allowed a relatively clear-cut analysis of the relations between the actors, their specific interests, and their actions. This approach was from the beginning interwoven with a second way of interpreting the Cold War: the economic approach.⁸ Here, the conflict was seen as a rivalry between divergent economic systems again based on national premises. It was concerned with questions of trade relations, the establishment of a capitalist or an etatist order, the European Recovery Program and what was called the politics of productivity⁹. In combination with political analysis it highlighted some

6 Cfr. for a more detailed study R. Schwartz, *Cold War Culture: Media and the Arts, 1945-1990*, New York, Facts on file, 1998.

7 J. Lukacs, *A History of the Cold War*, New York, Doubleday, 1961; K. Knorr (ed.), *NATO and American Security*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1959; J. Lewis Gaddis, *The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1941-1947*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1972; S. Ambrose, *Rise to Globalism: American Foreign Policy since 1938*, New York, Longman, 1988.

8 C. Bucheim, *Von der aufgeklärten Hegemonie zur Partnerschaft: Die USA und Westdeutschland in der Weltwirtschaft*, in D. Junker et al. (eds.), *Die USA und Deutschland im Kalten Krieg, 1945-1990: Ein Handbuch vol. I*, Stuttgart, Zeitalter des Kalten Krieges, 2001, pp. 401-23; V. R. Berghahn, *Zur Amerikanisierung der deutschen Wirtschaft*, in L. Herbst et al. (eds.), *Vom Marshallplan zur EWG: Die Eingliederung der Bundesrepublik Deutschland in die westliche Welt*, München, 1990; D. W. Ellwood, *The Marshall Plan and the Politics of Growth*, in P.M.R. Stirk and David Willis, (eds.), *Shaping Postwar Europe, European Unity and Disunity, 1945-1957*, New York, Pinter Publisher, 1991, pp. 15-41; M. J. Hogan, *The Marshall-Plan: America, Britain, and the Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1947-52*, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1987.

9 C. S. Maier, *The Politics of Productivity: Foundations of American International Economic Policy after World War II*, in C.S. Maier (ed.), *In Search of Stability: Explorations in Historical Political Economy*, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1987, pp. 121-52.

specific aspects of the Cold War, predominantly the role of technological progress and new strategic weapon systems, such as nuclear missiles and their impressive threatening power¹⁰. It was also possible to include the American and European societies into this broad analysis, as far as they were recognizable through institutionalist eyes¹¹. At this early stage of historiographical development, ideology, the third element of the threefold classical approach, also played an important role. The original way of including ideology into the broader picture had, however, some disadvantages. It was, first, on both the Western and the Marxist sides, based on a Marx-Mannheim understanding of the critique of ideologies as false understandings of reality¹². Therefore, it was always the other side that verbally suffered from ideology. Neither consensus liberalism in the West nor Communism in the East was respectively seen as adequate subject matters of ideological analysis. Ideologies were, secondly, used in a functional manner as cohesive measures, i.e. as a part of the conflict. Despite their functional value, ideologies were only seldom intrinsically combined with the basic levels of international relations, military potentials, and economic measures. Those different fields of analysis were treated as though they were independent from each other.

Thus, the interpretation of the Cold War as a nation state balance of power conflict, a politico-economic systemic struggle for global hegemony, and as an ideological conflict along class lines, certainly had some advantages. Still, some blind spots remained, one of them the obvious lack of coherence among the several levels of interpretation. The other critical disadvantage was revealed by the new schools of social historians that emerged in the late 1960s and tried to renew historical understanding and historiographical methodology. They stressed what they considered the backwardness of the classical threefold approach, especially when pointing out the importance of including domestic interests and agendas into the overall picture. The new social history proclaimed a primacy of domestic politics understood in terms of socio-economic interests¹³, while reducing the idea-oriented analysis of ideologies, though still basing their critique on the traditional Marx-

10 G. Herken, *The Winning Weapon: The Atomic Bomb and the Cold War, 1945-1950*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1980.

11 Cfr. for example V. R. Berghahn, *Amerika und der soziale Wandel in Deutschland*, in Junker et al. (eds.), *USA und Deutschland*, cit., pp. 755-74.

12 Cfr. in general M. J. Leffler, *The Specter of Communism: The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1917-1953*, New York, Hill and Wang, 1994; J. Holzer, *Der Kommunismus in Europa: Politische Bewegung und Herrschaftssystem*, Frankfurt/Main, Fischer, 1998.

13 G. Kolko, *Die Hintergründe der amerikanischen Außenpolitik*, Frankfurt/Main, Fischer, 1971.

Mannheim understanding of ideology¹⁴. For nearly two decades the different schools clashed with each other. In a simplified manner, the primacy of domestic issues stood against the primacy of foreign policy¹⁵. Structural analysis, based on sociological theory, struggled with a more narrative approach. This was quite fruitful, at least for a decade or so. But again, it turned out to be inadequate. Both approaches lacked convincing strategies to understand the significance of the Cold War holistically. Moreover, the two schools tended to concentrate more or less on the question of who had to bear the guilt for starting the Cold War¹⁶. A rising feeling that the old historiographical and methodological conflicts had become sterile, combined with the intrinsic necessities of the modern academic world, with its strong appeal for genuine originality, in turn led to the search for fresh starting points¹⁷.

The new attempt was based on a reinterpretation of the older notions of culture and ideology combined with a re-evaluation of their common importance for the specific structure of the Cold War¹⁸. Culture, once only seen as an additional element of historiographical analysis, became a central descriptive tool, with ideology as a major component. Ideology now was no longer understood as a false reproduction of reality, but as instrumental in the socially constructed process of ordering the chaos of perceptions. Therefore, ideology and culture both became anthropological constants that could be filled with generic contents. Thus, the assessment of the Cold War could be broadened. Questions of culture and ideology provided intellectual frameworks for the whole understanding of the diplomatic, economic, social, and military impetus of this conflict without reducing it into an idealistic narrative. A far more coherent interpretation of the Cold War as a clash of cultures shaped by ideologies and interests became possible.

14 E. Conze, *Zwischen Staatenwelt und Gesellschaftswelt: Die gesellschaftliche Dimension internationaler Geschichte*, in W. Loth and J. Osterhammel (eds.), *Internationale Geschichte: Theorien-Ergebnisse-Aussichten*, München, Oldenbourg, 2000, pp. 117-40.

15 Loth and Osterhammel (eds.), *Internationale Geschichte*, op. cit.

16 Cfr. for instance L. C. Gardner, *Architects of Illusion*, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1970; J. Lewis Gaddis, *Russian, the Soviet Union, and the United States: An Interpretative History*, New York, McGraw-Hill, 1992; R. W. Tucker, *The Radical Left in American Foreign Policy*, Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978.

17 J. Lewis Gaddis, *New Conceptual Approaches to the Study of American Foreign Relations*, in «Diplomatic History», No. 14, 1990, pp. 405-23.

18 V. M. Hudson (ed.), *Culture and Foreign Policy*, Boulder, University of Colorado Press, 1997; M. J. Holt, *Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy*, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1987; F. A. Ninkovich, *The Diplomacy of Ideas: U.S. Foreign Policy and Cultural Relations, 1938-1950*, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1981; E. S. Rosenberg, *Spreading the American Dream: American Economic and Cultural Expansion*, New York, Hill and Wang, 1982.

Meanwhile, the Cold War was increasingly integrated into far broader developments, such as, for instance, the processes of modernization, Americanization¹⁹, Westernization²⁰, and of intercultural or transatlantic transfer. By combining these different approaches, some older problems gained new significance, while other questions for the first time attracted attention. On the one hand, the question of whether there was something like a primacy of domestic interests or foreign policy became obsolete, as insights into the transnational character of the Cold War gave the whole problem a new direction. On the other hand, a formerly bizarre event like the famous «kitchen debate» between the US-American Vice President Richard M. Nixon and Soviet Russian Chairman Nikita S. Khrushchev in 1959 became more than just an ironic episode, because it referred to the inner structure of gender-related conflicts within the genuinely cultural sphere of the Cold War²¹. Propaganda and the quest for the inner stabilization of the developing hegemonic systems of the Cold War era became a central focus of historical research²². This led to further questions of how and why the formation of these hegemonic systems was accepted by the peoples and societies involved in the conflict.

To summarize the whole development: Introducing a cultural focus made the coherent integration of hitherto divided elements of the historical process possible. The Cold War could be interpreted as a transnational conflict on different, yet intertwined levels: a conflict involving the power struggles of nation states, the quest for economic and social solutions to modernization crises, and the search for underlying long-term and short-term cultural and ideological issues and transfers. On this basis, the analysis of the search for order and hegemony had to differ from that of traditional nation state power conflicts. Moreover, the Cold War could be seen as an integratory conflict, a form-giving element structuring a multitude of social and political struggles, even wars in the Third World. Thus the inner momentum of the

19 Cfr. P. Gassert, *Amerikanismus, Antiamerikanismus, Amerikanisierung: Neue Literatur zur Sozial-, Wirtschafts- und Kulturgeschichte des amerikanischen Einflusses auf Deutschland*, in «Archiv für Sozialgeschichte», No. 3, 1999, pp. 531-61.

20 A. Doering-Manteuffel, *Wie westlich sind die Deutschen? Amerikanisierung und Westernisierung im 20. Jahrhundert*, Göttingen, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1999.

21 Cfr. Wini Breines, *Young, White, and Miserable: Growing Up Female in the Fifties*, Boston, Beacon Press, 1992; C. Harrison, *On Account of Sex: The Politics of Women's Issues, 1945-1968*, Berkeley, California University Press, 1988.

22 F. Schumacher, *Kalter Krieg und Propaganda*, cit., pp. 17-31.

Cold War as a war *sui generis*²³ was acknowledged in a more precise manner. I want to exemplify the fruitfulness of this approach with the help of the history of the Congress for Cultural Freedom and its impact on the American hegemonic system after 1950²⁴.

In opposition to the historians and political scientists dealing with the developments of the Cold War, many of the active participants were, perhaps in a less reflected and non-intentional way, quite aware of its intrinsic specifics. The respective political traditions of both the Soviet Union and the U.S. made them better prepared for this cultural-ideological clash of systems and ideas. While I want to concentrate on the U.S. and her hegemonic system, many of my points could be made with regard to the USSR as well. Both countries were based on a plurality of ethnicities, races, and even languages. Therefore, the theoretical European role model of integrated nation states relating on an at least asserted ethnic or cultural homogeneity could not function. Integration had thus to rely on ideas and national myths, i.e. on an artificial ideology much more obvious than in the European standard case where the invention of traditions was much more subtle. Furthermore, both sides had powerful ideological instruments at their disposal that were basically meant to cross the borderlines of states and societies: Communist egalitarianism and liberal-capitalist individualism both claimed to be the legitimate heirs of the European enlightenment and of the progressive strains of history. It was not a rivalry between the forces of reaction and the forces of progressivism that lay at the bottom of a bitter mutual antagonism; it was the very fact, that both ideological and cultural systems were so akin to each other. This struggle over a common heritage was combined with another underlying element - the tendency to interpret politics dualistically or to fall prey to the Manichean trap²⁵. This was closely combined with the appeal to the masses on which both sides relied, and which reinforced the inability to compromise. However «realistic» the domestic and foreign agendas of the USA and the USSR in every single issue may have been, it would nevertheless be

23 C.D. Jackson to Dwight D. Eisenhower, 21.9.1953, in F. Schumacher, *Kalter Krieg und Propaganda*, p. 111.

24 Cfr. in general P. Coleman, *The Liberal Conspiracy: The Congress for Cultural Freedom and the Struggle for the Mind in Postwar Europe*, New York, Routledge, 1989; P. Grémion, *Intelligence de l'Anticommunisme: Le Congrès pour la Liberté de la Culture, 1950-1975*, Paris, Fayard, 1995; M. Hochgeschwender, *Freiheit in der Offensive? Der Kongreß für kulturelle Freiheit und die Deutschen*, München, Oldenbourg, 1998; F. Stonor Saunders, *Who Paid the Piper? The CIA and the Cultural Cold War*, London, Diane Pub Co., 1999; V. R. Berghahn, *America and the Intellectual Cold Wars in Europe*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2001; G. Scott-Smith, *The Politics of Apolitical Culture: The Congress for Cultural Freedom, the CIA, and Post-war American Hegemony*, London, Routledge, 2002.

25 D.Junker, *Von der Weltmacht zur Supermacht: Amerikanische Außenpolitik im 20. Jahrhundert*, Mannheim, 1995.

superficial to deny or to neglect these structural preconditions that shaped the «realism» of all further actions.

In the early days of the Cold War the Americans were not that sure that they would be able to win the battle for the «hearts and minds» of the peoples involved in the struggle. Yet they dealt with this problem in a characteristically American way. While on the one hand there was a bitter internal conflict of how to shape the relations with the Soviet Union and her allies, especially after the occupation of Poland that embittered the Polish minority in the U.S., it was non-governmental actors that laid the ideological foundations for Cold War anti-Communism. As the Republicans and the right-wing Democrats were traditionally anti-Communist, this was a battle within the left wing of the Democratic Party, involving consensus liberals, progressives, and radicals of different colours as well as complex groups of intellectuals, some of them with a Stalinist past.²⁶ The most important lobbyists for a strict anti-Communist course from the left were the *Union of Democratic Americans* (UDA), the *Americans for Democratic Action* (ADA), the *American Federation of Labor* (AFL), the remnants of the long gone *Committee for Cultural Freedom*, an intellectual anti-totalitarian organization of the 1930s led by John Dewey and Sidney Hook, and the *New York Jewish Intellectuals*²⁷, a group of authors, critics, and artists loosely connected by high-brow magazines, such as, for example, the *New Leader* or *Commentary*. Interconnected with European émigré circles, they began during World War II to criticize the alliance with the Soviet Union and Stalin. After 1945, predominantly in 1947, they were actively engaged in excluding left-wing New Dealers from power in the Democratic Party. Moreover, despite all their domestic troubles, they tried from the beginning to combine their own agenda with that of comparable European organizations. It was the specific advantage of the New York Jewish Intellectuals to base on already existing transatlantic networks. They and the ADA actively searched for further allies in a struggle against Communism perceived as being apocalyptic in the very sense of the word - and they found them.

Since the late 1930s a group of former Communists turned anti-Communist had begun cooperating against the Stalinist propaganda in Western Europe. Many of them had worked for the *agitprop* department of the COMINTERN in Paris, the

26 Mary Sperling McAuliffe, *Crisis on the Left: Cold War Politics and American Liberals*, Amherst, University of Massachusetts Press, 1978; Alonzo L. Hamby, *Beyond the New Deal: Harry S. Truman and American Liberalism*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1973.

27 A. Bloom, *The New York Intellectuals: The Rise and Decline of the Anti-Stalinist Left*, Chapel Hill, The University of North Carolina Press, 1987; H. Wilford, *The New York Intellectuals: From Vanguard to Institution*, Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1995; R. H. Pells, *The Liberal Mind in a Conservative Age: American Intellectuals in the 1940s and 1950s*, Middletown, Harper Trade, 1984; C. Brock, *The Americans for Democratic Action: Its Role in National Politics*, Westport, Greenwood Press, 1985.

Institut für Faschismusstudien (INFA) headed by Willi Münzenberg²⁸, one of the ablest leading members of the COMINTERN. Ironically, it was his congenial way of dealing with the intellectual fellow travellers of Communism during the 1930s that proved successful when transferred in a liberal-democratic framework after 1950. During the Spanish Civil War, with all the NKVD cruelties against the non-Stalinist communist left, some of Münzenberg's co-workers, such as, for instance, Arthur Koestler²⁹, Ignazio Silone, and Manès Sperber, started to doubt the inherent wisdom and humaneness of Stalin's approach. In the late 1930s they, and in the end even Münzenberg himself, broke with Stalinist orthodoxy and formed the core group of post war left-wing anti-Communism. While Münzenberg was assumedly killed by the NKVD, Koestler, Silone, and Sperber were able to survive and to go on networking. During his Swiss exile Silone was able to contact some of the later important leaders of the *Union of European Federalists* (UEF), i.e. the liberal part of the European integrationist movement. However, the activities of Koestler proved to be of more significant for the development after World War II. He became a friend of George Orwell, another disillusioned member of the non-Communist left in Britain, who introduced him into the left-wing liberal circles grouped around the magazine *Horizon*. There Koestler met some of the reformists within the British Labour Party, such as, for example, Anthony Crosland and Richard H.S. Crossman. Like the small, but vibrant anti-Communist circles in the U.S. they began developing plans to counter Stalinist activities in post-war Europe.

It took, nonetheless, until 1946/47 before the two separate continental networks were transformed into one unified transatlantic and transnational network³⁰. On the one hand, the New York Intellectuals, with the help of their widely read magazines (*New Leader, Commentary, Partisan Review, and Politics*), were willing and able to cross the Atlantic. They, in cooperation with the ADA, established a ring of journalists and correspondents all over Western Europe, especially David E. Williams in London and Melvin J. Lasky in Berlin. The AFL built up a similar net with Irving Brown in Bruxelles in its center. On the other hand, Koestler travelled to the U.S., where he was introduced to the American anti-Communist organizations. In this early phase, the whole process of coordinating the wide-ranging, yet often-inefficient activities of the non-Communist left was done without government intervention. This changed,

28 A.M. Corbin-Schuffels, *Manès Sperber: Un Combat contre la Tyrannie 1934-1960*, Bern, Peter Lang, 1996, pp. 15-28; B. Gross, *Willi Münzenberg: Eine politische Biographie*, Stuttgart, Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1967.

29 I. Hamilton, *Koestler: A Biography*, New York, Macmillan, 1982.

30 S. Hochgeschwender, *Freiheit*, cit., pp. 96-138.

however, when during the Waldorf-Astoria conference (1947), a propaganda meeting of the Stalinist peace partisans in New York City, the American intellectuals and labor unionists for the first time organized successful opposition against a fellow-traveller propaganda measure. Interestingly enough, it was Michael Josselson, a field agent of the newly formed *Central Intelligence Agency* (CIA), who, without exposing his true identity, showed eager interest in the activities of Sidney Hook, Mary McCarthy, Nicholas Nabokov and others on the anti-Stalinist left. This interest from the intelligence services, however, did not necessarily strengthen the transatlantic network. On the contrary, its first efforts outside the U.S. failed. It was not possible to repeat the success of New York some months later in Paris at yet another conference of the fellow-travelling intellectuals of the World Peace Movement. Yet, the propagandistic failure in Paris to successfully tackle the Communist initiative proved the necessity of a strong transnational reaction against Communist and fellow traveller propaganda efforts³¹. In France and Italy, strong Communist parties influenced the masses, while intellectuals, such as, for instance, Jean-Paul Sartre and Maurice Merleau-Ponty articulated a refined version of traditional anti-American stereotypes³². Furthermore, in Britain, Fabian left-wingers tried to dominate the Labour Party, while in West Germany national neutralists and pacifists opposed the U.S. American policy of framing a Western alliance. All these national activities were orchestrated and transnationalized due to Soviet interests with the help of Münzenbergian fellow-traveller tactics. It was predominantly the organization of the so-called World Peace Partisans³³, led by the Joliot-Curies, that proved to be immensely popular, even among non-Communists, and useful in regulating a transnationally organized, yet nationally rooted movement against the American policies. There was a real threat in all these overt and covert Communist activities, even if some recent historians are right in arguing that the Cold War was in part an imagined war. It was this very moment of imagination and perception that made reactions inevitable. The rules of the game did not allow any lack of reaction, because this would have led to misperceptions about the own strength or weakness. Therefore, the Paris mishap became the trigger for far-reaching developments. As the U.S. Americans acknowledged the dangerous perils of the Communist fellow-travelling activities, they were in a state of constant unease. In autumn 1949, during

31 Cfr. D. Cate, *The Fellow-Travellers*, New York, Simon & Schuster, 1973.

32 R. Kuisel, *Seducing the French: The Dilemma of Americanization*, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1993.

33 L. S. Wittner, *One World or None: A History of the World Disarmament Movement Through 1953*, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1993.

a conference on the culture of the European integrationist movement in Lausanne, David Rousset launched a plan for a «Congress for Cultural Freedom», to meet in Berlin in 1950. Many individuals who later became members of the organization with the same name (CCF) were already present in Lausanne, such as, for example, Carlo Schmid, Denis de Rougemont, Melvin J. Lasky, and so on³⁴. Because a Frenchman presented it at a European occasion, the whole project did not look like an American idea at first. Yet, the preliminary planning had already been done by Melvin J. Lasky, Ruth Fischer, an émigré living in New York, and Arthur Koestler in August 1949. From the beginning the two transatlantic intellectual networks were involved, while the AFL provided the necessary subsidies with the help of Irving Brown and Jay Lovestone, another former Communist. Subsequently, an organizational committee, headed by Lasky, was formed and it was able to win five of the outstanding contemporary philosophers from Europe and the U.S. as honorary presidents of the future congress: Bertrand Russell, Jacques Maritain, John Dewey, Karl Jaspers, and Benedetto Croce. This was in many ways significant, because they represented the five major current trends of European as well as American philosophy, namely analysis, Neo-Thomism, pragmatism, existentialism, and Neo-Hegelianism. They also represented the five most important nations of the Atlantic community, Britain, France, the U.S., Germany, and Italy. And they had a third thing in common: All of them stood for a liberal variant of their specific intellectual tradition. Thus they were symbols of both the broadness of Western thought opposing the perceived monolith of Marxian dialectical materialism in its Stalinist interpretation, and, moreover, a specific strand of reformist, intellectual liberalism in contrast to Catholic or secular conservatism and traditionalist socialism.

It was Lasky who predominantly deserved the credit for organizing these consensus liberals, whether they were philosophers, journalists, politicians, intellectuals, or trade unionists. This was only possible because he had built up his own network of American and European intellectuals long before the idea of a Congress for Cultural Freedom had been born. Lasky, born of Jewish immigrant stock in January 1920, had studied at New York City College during the late 1930s, when it had been an institution solidly influenced by more or less heterodox Marxists. As a student he had become a Trotskyite, but, like so many others, he changed his views after the Hitler-Stalin treaty. After finishing his studies he became a journalist of Sol Levitas' social democratic magazine *New Leader*. Through this connection he became affiliated with the New York Intellectuals, as well as with the ADA. After World War II, Lasky came to Germany, again serving as journalist for the U.S. Army and the

34 C. Schmid, *Erinnerungen*, Bern, Scherz Bern, 1979, p. 484.

New Leader. Intellectually broad-minded and - somewhat surprisingly - a good organizer, Melvin J. Lasky was the ideal candidate for a new cultural propaganda effort of OMGUS, the American Military Government in Germany: the monthly magazine *Der Monat*. After some internal struggles *Der Monat*, which was founded in 1948, rapidly became the single most important cultural magazine in Western Europe, with a circulation of some 20.000. It was widely acknowledged as a high quality monthly, certainly due to Lasky's rigid intellectual and literary standards. The example of the New York Intellectuals' magazines was unmistakable. Lasky and his co-editor, the German Hellmuth Jaesrich, clearly wanted to counter Communist propaganda, but by no means on a lowbrow level. In combining his journalistic and his editorial activities, Lasky was able to establish many personal contacts and relationships that helped him when he was organizing the Berlin Congress for Cultural Freedom³⁵.

In the last days of June 1950, Berlin was a vivid, excited city. Not only did the city accommodate 121 participants from more than 20 nations that took part in Lasky's congress. World politics overshadowed the glamorous event.³⁶ During the very same week, North Korean troops invaded South Korea, an act of Communist aggression that certainly influenced the intellectuals in West Berlin, and immediately caused some troubles among them. The anti-Communist radicals, led by Koestler, Hook, James Burnham, and Franz Borkenau, favored a clear and at times even fanatical language against the aggression. The moderates, i.e. the majority of the British and the Italian delegation, headed by Silone, wanted open and diverse discussions. The battle cry of the radicals «No Freedom for the Enemies of Freedom» seemed to the moderates to doom the success of liberal anti-Communism from within. The overwhelming majority of the participants were, however, willing to perpetuate the Congress as an organization. This proved to be a decisive decision for more than a decade. In September 1950 a preliminary organizational committee met at Bruxelles in order to sort out the different options and give the newly formed CCF a structure. For some years it was not clear whether the CCF should be a strictly Mützenbergian mass organization in analogy to the fellow-travelling World Peace Partisans or an elitist, formalized circle of intellectuals, writers and politicians. In the end the latter option seemed to be the most appropriate. Only in France and India did the CCF become something like a mass movement, but it was never comparable to the multi-

35 M. Ketterle, *Literatur und Politik im Nachkriegsdeutschland der Zeitschrift Der Monat 1948-1955*, MA-Thesis, München, 1984, pp. 38-47.

36 S. Hochgeschwender, *Freiheit*, cit., pp. 229-52; K.U. Merz, *Kalter Krieg als antikommunistischer Widerstand: Die Kampfgruppe gegen Unmenschlichkeit 1948-1959*, München, Oldenbourg, 1987, pp. 111-15; T. Coleman, *Liberal Conspiracy*, cit., pp. 19-31.

million membership of Communist-styled movements. Despite these shortcomings, the original Münzenbergian frame of indirectly leading intellectuals into combat for a common cause under the restrictions of an organizational framework was adopted.

Besides these more general developments, the Bruxelles group decided to install an international secretariat in Paris, led by the Russian exile musician Nicholas Nabokov with the CIA field-agent (a fact unknown to most of the members) Michael Josselson as Executive Secretary³⁷. An International Executive Committee, which would meet twice a year, became the most influential institution of the CCF, with the exception of the International Secretariat. Moreover, national executive committees were planned and installed over the years to come. All the national chapters were combined with nationally circulating monthly or quarterly magazines that were controlled by the Paris International Bureau. Thus, the whole organization had an ambiguous character. While it was, on the one hand, organized on the basis of national or regional chapters dealing with specific national problems, such as for example facing a national Communist Party, the decisive influence remained in the hands of a small group in Paris who were explicitly not bound by national considerations. They were, rather, members of a transnational jet-setting community of intellectuals, and they thought in a transnational manner. Thus adaptation to the structural necessities of the Cold War setting was guaranteed. This made the difference between the CCF and a multitude of other Cold War organizations, such as the *Kampfgruppe gegen Unmenschlichkeit* (KgU) and the *Untersuchungsausschuß freiheitlicher Juristen* (UfJ) in West Germany, which failed within a short period because they were based on more traditional assumptions of nation-state interests.

One central problem remained: the quest for a solid solution to the Congress's financial problems. The organization was always in need of money. During the first two years, from 1950 to 1952, the AFL funded the CCF³⁸. This was part of the much broader operational scheme of the American trade unions in Europe, where they fought the influence of Stalinist unions on the Western European workforce, building their own transnational network of persons and organizations. Despite these initial efforts, however, it was certain that the AFL was no option for a steady financial support of the CCF³⁹. Therefore, Michael Josselson, who had already covertly funded

37 Michael Josselson Papers, Harry Ransom Humanities Research Center at the University of Texas at Austin, Boxes 5-29.

38 Saunders, *Who Paid the Piper?*, cit., pp. 129-45. It is quite certain that the AFL funds were subsidized by the CIA that had started to give money to the American trade unions in 1948. The AFL, however, was rather independent in distributing its financial aid according to its own aims, cfr. T. Morgan, *A Covert Life: Jay Lovestone: Communist, Anti-Communist, and Spymaster*, New York, Random House, 1999.

39 Cfr. on the AFL and its own transnational network J. Angster, *Konsenskapitalismus und Sozialdemokratie: Die Westernisierung von SPD und DGB von 1940 bis 1965*, München, 2003.

the Berlin congress, intensified the contacts with the CIA. In Langley the assumed success of channelling money and ideas into the Italian elections of 1948 had led to the belief that this sort of covert action could help to fight Communism all over the world. From 1951 on, the CIA began secretly to subsidize the CCF with nearly \$800.000 a year with the help of dummy foundations funnelling the money into *bona fide* foundations, such as the Ford Foundation, the Fleischmann Foundation, and the Rockefeller Foundation. Julius Fleischmann, a philanthropic millionaire as well as a collaborator with the CIA was, together with Josselson and John C. Hunt, a major figure in this operation. Thomas Braden, an expert on covert action, planned and executed the operation from the CIA side. Further money came from regular *bona fide* foundations, like the Ford Foundation and the Rockefeller Foundation. When after 1956 the Ford Foundation ended its cooperation with the CIA, Josselson and the Paris bureau desperately tried to change the CCF's financial support from covert sources into a more legal system of self financing.

It is important to understand the respective interests of both the CCF and the CIA because the role of the CIA has long since sparked debates on the moral integrity of the intellectuals collaborating with the CCF. First, it was a relationship based on mutual interests, not on the basis of orders given by the CIA. There were only three minor incidents where Josselson as the extended arm of the agency intervened into the editorial policy of the CCF's magazines, the most important part of the work of the CCF. He twice censored articles, one written by the radical Dwight Macdonald, the other one written by Boris Guldenberg that were in his eyes too critical of United States foreign policy⁴⁰. The other incident is even more telling, because Josselson reprimanded Friedrich Torberg, the editor of *Forum*, the Austrian magazine of the CCF, for being too radically anti-Communist and not being intellectually sound enough. This last intervention fitted into Josselson's regular activities. Especially during the early 1950s, when the radical anti-Communists dominated the CCF and even more the *American Committee for Cultural Freedom (ACCF)*,⁴¹ the American branch of the CCF, he and Nabokov did everything to strengthen the intellectual appeal of the CCF by moderating its anti-Communist stance⁴².

40 Michael Josselson to Dwight Macdonald, 15.3.1967, Josselson Papers, Harry Ransom Humanities Research Center at the University at Texas at Austin, Box 27; Michael Josselson to Boris Guldenberg, 13.11.1961, IACF/CCF-Archives, University of Chicago, Joseph Regenstein Library, Series II, Box 117, Folder 9.

41 T. Coleman, *Liberal Conspiracy*, pp. 159-70.

42 Cfr. Michael Josselson and Henry R. Krygvier, 15.1.1954, IACF/CCF-Archives, University of Chicago, Joseph Regenstein Library, Series I, Box 2, Folder 6.

Secondly, it was not the CIA that founded the CCF. It is true that the CIA was from the beginning involved in the process of creating the organization, but when the CIA was founded in late 1947, the intellectuals forming the CCF were already active in combating Stalinism. They just searched for a source of money that would provide them with the means necessary to do what they always wanted to do. Therefore, it is wrong to believe that these intellectuals were corrupted by the American intelligence service. Both sides used each other, whatever the moral implications of this story may be.

Thirdly, and perhaps most importantly, the CCF was carefully integrated into a flexible framework of national and transnational activities in order to secure U.S. hegemony and the hegemony of liberal capitalism in Western Europe and the so-called Third World. The CIA, though, acted within an even broader system of U.S. efforts at penetrating societies, involving governmental and non-governmental agents, with the same aim. Trade unions,⁴³ churches and sectarian groups, political affiliations, economic relations, exchange programs, movies, magazines, books, and the icons of popular culture were all elements of this broader scheme. It would nevertheless be wrong to search for an all-encompassing master plan directing these highly complex apparatus of Cold War relations and U.S. hegemony. There are two intertwined arguments supporting my thesis:

First, the American concept of hegemony differed from classical concepts.⁴⁴ It was never a one-sided approach favoring only «hard» hegemony. In contrast, the Americans developed an extremely flexible combination of hard and soft hegemony approaches. This was a result of domestic necessities as well as an adaptation to the circumstances of a global conflict. The very efficiency of this approach was based on a combination of a long-term strategy (NSC-68),⁴⁵ relying on a certain definition of national and supranational interests, and ad-hoc decisions with regard to actual developments, allowing toleration of some political impact from other partners. The fact that Americans allowed or had to allow interventions and egoistic behavior by some of their allies does not change the argument, as long as the Americans were able to gain control whenever necessary, and as long as everybody knew that the Americans were truly the hegemon, a fact that even General de Gaulle never forgot.

43 J. Angster, "Safe By Democracy": American Hegemony and the "Westernization" of West German Labor, in «Amerikastudien», No. 46, 2001, pp. 557-72.

44 B. Neuss, "Benign Hegemonic Power": A Means of Refashioning Western Europa in the Image of the United States, in «Amerikastudien», No. 46, 2001, pp. 535-56.

45 Cfr. E. R. May (ed.), *American Cold War Strategy: Interpreting NSC-68*, Boston, Bedford Books of St. Martin's Press, 1993.

Secondly, it was not even desirable from the U.S. perspective to develop a long-term strategy exceeding NSC-68. Precisely because the U.S. sought global hegemony, it had to gain a certain amount of flexibility, openness, and the ability to act and react adequately. The American «empire by invitation»⁴⁶ among Western democracies was the most realistic way to win the hearts and minds of allied populations, which was of primary importance in a transnational conflict. This of course did not keep the U.S. from setting aside such restraints when it became necessary. Within this broader framework the CCF was one part of what may be called the cultural front of the Cold War. It was neither the only element of this front nor was it excessively subsidized. Yet, the CCF was an important factor, because it was a reliably transnationalized organization dealing both with national cultures and with the systemic emphases of a transnational conflict. Of course, this did not mean the strategy always worked without problems. Two of the U.S. governmental agencies foremost dealing with the cultural and propagandistic effects of the Cold War were, for example, never really able to coordinate their standpoints toward the CCF. During the same time as the CIA subsidized the CCF, the FBI and the HUAC were trying to limit the influence of its intellectual leaders, believing them to be covert Communists⁴⁷.

Culture, ideology, and propaganda were the main purposes of the CCF on both the transnational as well as the national level. The major means of transporting the intrinsic ideas of the organization were the magazines. While edited on the national level, they were controlled and harmonized by the Paris bureau⁴⁸. Besides Melvin Lasky's *Der Monat* that only in 1958 became an official monthly of the CCF, the most influential magazines were the London-based Anglo-Saxon *Encounter*, edited by Irving Kristol, Stephen Spender, and - after 1958 - Melvin J. Lasky, and *Preuves*, edited by François Bondy in Paris. The Spanish anti-Franquist magazine *Cuadernos*, *Tempo Presente* in Italy, *Forum* in Austria, or *Quadrant* in Australia completed the picture. With the help of its monthly or quarterly magazines the CCF was able to reach regularly hundreds of thousands of intellectually interested persons all over the world, even inside the East. Their style was comparable, but not uniform.⁴⁹ Normally, the CCF magazines were intended to present a broad variety of articles on highbrow

46 G. Lundestad, *The American 'Empire' and other Studies of U.S. Foreign Policy in a Comparative Perspective*, Oslo, Scandinavian University Press, 1990.

47 H. Mitgang, *Überwacht: Grosse Autoren in den Dossiers amerikanischer Geheimdienste*, Düsseldorf, 1992.

48 T. Coleman, *Liberal Conspiracy*, cit., pp. 59-102.

49 S. Hochgeschwender, *Freiheit*, cit., pp. 159-203.

culture and actual discussions within the intellectual circles of the anti-Communist liberal intelligentsia. Furthermore, Bondy and his co-editors always tried to present their reviews as discursive forums with vivid and contrary discussions on a wide selection of issues ranging from politics to modern arts, thereby influencing national intellectual and academic circles. During the first phase of their activity this element of their work was predominantly anti-Communist, later on, after Stalin's death in 1953, it became more reformist and more elaborate in its academic approach. The most important success of the CCF's magazines was the launching of the debate on the end of ideology since 1955, thereby supporting the first attempts of an early detente policy by implying that Communism and liberalism were on a common road to a participatory technocratic system. Thus, the magazines served as transmitters for rather high quality anti-Communist propaganda and as institutions providing a vast readership with international cultural information. While the politics of anti-Communism directly focussed on a pro-American position, the cultural element of the magazines was much more internationally focussed. This meant, at any rate, an attempt to at least soften the widespread stereotype of an America lacking any culture whatsoever. American culture was interpreted as an integral part of a Western

culture, a transatlantic culture reaching back into the age of enlightenment. Thus, the Americans were indirectly shown to be heirs of a common heritage and a community of common values.

The same cultural and propagandistic elements can be shown with regard to the second major institutional option of the CCF - the congresses. Berlin 1950, Paris 1952, Hamburg 1953, Milan 1955, and, finally, again Berlin in 1960 were milestones of the CCF's internal and external development. Considered as purely propagandistic tools they served as counterpoints to the serial mass conventions of the pro-Communist fellow travellers. The congresses were, at least in the 1950s, quite successful in providing the CCF with a platform for the international media. Furthermore, they symbolized and actively led the way to internal changes. We already discussed the Berlin congress, but one may say that Paris 1952 was even more important, despite the internal analysis that it was a failure⁵⁰. This congress served indeed a double purpose: On the one hand the CCF was freed from its predominant and nearly exclusive anti-Communist ideological outlook by stressing its cultural impact. This led, on the other hand, to a rapid decline of the radically anti-Communist forces inside the CCF, which consequently allowed the institutional survival of the CCF after the end of the first phase of the Cold War in 1953/54.

50 T. Coleman, *Liberal Conspiracy*, cit., pp. 55-57; P. Grémion, *Intelligence*, cit., pp. 82-98.

Moreover, the congress «Masterpieces of the Twentieth Century» presented, like the magazines, a modern, commonly westernized culture including the U.S. Abstract art and modern music dominated this congress that was very much similar to an art's festival. This did not only aim at the sterility of Stalinist art, but even more on the prejudices of French, especially Sartrean prejudices and reservations toward American cultural life.

The congress in Hamburg 1953 «Science and Freedom» again had another function. For the first time, the CCF tried to include scientists into the propaganda efforts of the West⁵¹. In an age of anxiety and belief in scientific rationality and progress this was only a logical result of common beliefs. Nearly 110 scientists and scholars discussed the impact of social sciences, genetics, and nuclear technology on the confrontational situation of the modern world. Of utter importance were intense discussions about the role of government and ideology in the world of academia. For the first time within the CCF the Western hemisphere was criticized for its financial and organizational interventionism in the field of scientific research. However, antitotalitarianism remained most forceful. Lyssenkoism, the fascist concept of eugenics and other results of Nazi and Stalinist research were - because of their obvious lack of any scientific basis - openly rejected. The CCF even founded a filial organization, the *Committee for Science and Freedom* (CSF) headed by Michael and George Polanyi⁵². But again propaganda was not the only issue at stake. Like the CCF in the field of intellectual life and in political or social sciences, the CSF started the attempt to transnationalize scientists, yet with less success than the CCF. The CSF however functioned when, for instance, in West Germany intellectuals and scientists in 1955 tried to force the right-wing extremist minister for education of Lower Saxony, Leonhard Schlüter (FDP) to resign. Following the Münzenbergian operational pattern of the CCF the CSF successfully organized an international campaign with open letters of protest to the London *Times* and other well-known newspapers. In the end, Schlüter had to leave office. This action proved that the CCF and its affiliates were no longer exclusively concerned with Communism. It more and more became an agency of Westernization in the sense that it provided its members and the readers of its magazines with a set of consensus liberal values.

This became more evident with the Milan congress of 1955, «The Future of Freedom», were left-wing liberal politicians, intellectuals, and the leading figures of

Keynesian economic theory met each other⁵³. This time the propagandistic element was minimal, while on the other hand the internal Westernizing effort became more and more significant. The CCF concentrated itself less on cultural propaganda than on the reformist attempt to reconstruct the European non-Communist labor movement from within by freeing it from the remnants of Marxism. This would have repercussions on the whole political system in Western Europe, because it would acquaint the Europeans with the realistic possibility of a bipartisan system at least in foreign policy, perhaps even in a reform of the Western European societies according to the aims of consensus liberalism and Keynesianism. The CCF with its congresses and the conferences of the later 1950s and early 1960s when it became evident that the old congress system had outlived itself, perhaps was a counterweight against the more traditionally Marxist *Socialist International* (SI). Since 1953, especially since 1955 it provided labor reformists with their own transnational network, with an elaborate ideology, and with cultural, propagandistic and scientific background. Labor politicians, such as, for example, Willy Brandt, Carlo Schmid, Denis Healy, Anthony Crosland, Richard H.S. Crossman, and others met scientists like Michael Polanyi, J. Robert Oppenheimer, John Kenneth Galbraith, and American ADA politicians. The CCF was not the proximate cause for the renewal of many Western European Labor parties in the late 1950s, but it certainly was an important instrument of coordinating these diverse and nationally based processes within a broader context.

But what were the ideological implications of this Westernizing consensus liberalism? It was not a fixed ideological system in the sense of Stalinist Marxism. This would have been counterproductive, as the CCF always tried to combine two different aspects of consensus, one broader consensus including conservatives, secular, protestant, and Catholic, liberals, and reformist socialists and based on anti-Communism⁵⁴ and anti-totalitarianism⁵⁵. Therefore, anti-totalitarianism, both as an analytic tool as well as a means of propaganda served as the major bond of this broader consensus. During the years before 1953/55 it was pre-eminent within the CCF, yet it was never the only ideological element the CCF was based on. This was a result of the second consensus that was more narrowly constructed, because it predominantly aimed at the non-Communist left. Here again anti-Communism and

53 T. Coleman, *Liberal Conspiracy*, cit., pp. 108-11; S. Hochgeschwender, *Freiheit*, cit., pp. 450-53; G. Scott-Smith, *The Congress for Cultural Freedom, the End of Ideology and the 1955 Milan Conference: Defining the Parameters of Discourse*, in «Journal of Contemporary History», No. 37, 2002, pp. 437-56.

54 Cfr. R. Gid, *Powers, Not Without Honor: The History of American Anticommunism*, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1998.

55 S. Hochgeschwender, *Freiheit*, cit., pp. 253-64.

anti-totalitarianism were of primary importance, but they were never, not even during the first years of the CCF, the only focus of its activities. Liberal anti-Communism was always more than just a negative, exclusive, and singular ideological element. On the contrary, it was, besides being a political necessity in the struggle with conservative forces, who tended to identify left-wing reformism with Marxism, a starting point for reformist measures, excluding collectivist radicalism, while including elements of social reform. The anti-fascist element of anti-totalitarianism allowed the construction of continuity between the struggle against fascism and National Socialism and the actual fight against Communism that could be interpreted as being the traitor in this story. Moreover, the anti-fascist heritage was meaningful to all the former Communists in the CCF, as it had been a central experience of their lives. But the CCF, even its Jewish members, was never really active in *Vergangenheitsbewältigung*⁵⁶. According to many anti-totalitarian consensus liberals Nazism was a dead threat, while otherwise Stalinism was existent and very aggressive. Only the West German chapter and Melvin J. Lasky were involved in attempts to fight Neo-Nazism, an activity only tolerated, but not actively supported by the Paris leadership of the CCF.

The next ideological element of the 1950s and 1960s consensus liberalism was liberal individualism, a result of the common transatlantic heritage of the enlightenment. It should be stressed that the CCF preferred the Anglo-Saxon interpretation of the much broader enlightenment tradition, i.e. the consensus liberals preferred individualist solutions to egalitarianism. Individuality, furthermore, meant personal liberty, and - something of utmost importance for the members of the CCF - the freedom of cultural expression in the broadest sense. One may conclude that for the CCF freedom in all its variances was the one single notion that stood on clear contrast to the more collectivist and egalitarian Communist peace propaganda with its broader social implications. The consensus liberals were, however, not inclined to uncritically accept the dogmas of a utilitarian *laissez-faire* ideology. Thus, they tried to combine liberal individualism with more egalitarian and reformist social attitudes, thereby bringing together U.S. American progressive traditions of elite reformism and government action with the etatist approach of European socialism and conservatism. The *General Theory* (1936) of John Maynard Keynes was quite helpful in theoretically uniting those two different elements. This allowed consensus liberalism to present itself as a solution for the modernization crises of industrialized societies all over the world, especially by hinting at the

⁵⁶ Cfr. P. Novick, *Nach dem Holocaust: Der Umgang mit dem Massenmord*, Stuttgart, Dtv, 2001, pp. 141-68.

American New Deal successes during the Great Depression and the post war boom of the 1950s.⁵⁷ The CCF and other consensus liberals were thus in the forefront of the modern planning euphoria that characterized European and American (and the Russian) societies of the 1950s to the early 1970s during the high tide of progressive optimism.

The basic belief system of consensus liberalism included two further aspects: Wilsonian internationalism⁵⁸ and cosmopolitanism⁵⁹. They were somehow the exterior elements, compared with the interior notions of individualism and Keynesian reformism. Wilsonian internationalism stood for an enlightened, rational, and planned rearrangement of traditional diplomacy by international peace keeping measures and organizations, by international tribunals and the enforcement of internationally accepted values, rules, and regulations. Despite rooting deeply in the American domestic struggle between «isolationists» and «internationalists», Wilsonian internationalism proved its validity when even Republican administrations used international alliance systems to guard the American hegemony. Basically, the strong American support for the European integrationist movement, which was shared by the CCF, reflects this attitude. As Wilsonian internationalism, furthermore, included the distribution of democracy and capitalism as key elements of future peace keeping, it was easily and tightly knit together with individualism and Keynesianism. Cosmopolitanism, however, had a more far-reaching ideological impact. On one level, it was just a reverse momentum aiming at the rising lack of socialist internationalism within the Stalinized Communist movement and its nationalistic implications. But, moreover, cosmopolitanism was part of a transnational lifestyle of Western intellectuals. Many of them, living in New York, London, Rome, or Paris, became more and more part of a milieu *sui generis*, which was based on common ideas. They shared the same arguments, the same quarrels, and the same friends. Their way of life was comparable; the English language was the *lingua franca* of this milieu. Thus, cosmopolitanism was perhaps the most intrinsically form-giving value of consensus liberalism.

57 Cfr. S. Fraser and G. Gerstle (eds.), *The Rise and Fall of the New Deal Order 1930-1980*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1989.

58 Cfr. T. Smith, *America's Mission: The United States and the Worldwide Struggle for Democracy in the Twentieth Century*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1994; F. A. Ninkovich, *The Wilsonian Century: U.S. Foreign Policy since 1900*, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1999.

59 P. Coulmas, *Weltbürger: Geschichte einer Menschheitssehnsucht*, Hamburg, Rowolht, 1990.

Another element is still missing: pragmatism, the philosophy elucidated by John Dewey, Charles Sanders Peirce, and others⁶⁰. Because pragmatism was the most American part of consensus liberalism, it was perhaps the least successful. Even members of the CCF tended to prefer European philosophical traditions, such as, for instance, existentialism, Hegelianism, Kantianism, or Thomism. However, pragmatism had some impact on the basic ideology of the consensus liberals, because it sharpened the anti-totalitarian critique of Nazism and Communism. According to the pragmatist analysis these two rivals were at the bottom of their thought deeply influenced by a Hegelian holistic account of the world and of being. A Platonic-Hegelian *Weltanschauung* seemed to be the foundation of all the enemies of freedom as understood by Cold War liberalism and pragmatism seemed to provide liberalism with an answer to systems of totality inevitably leading to totalitarianism. At least, pragmatism was able to undermine the European traditions in order to systematically qualify their possible scope. In the end, a liberalized version of Hegelianism or Thomism or existentialism was acceptable to the flexible world of ideas of consensus liberalism.

The ideological offer of the CCF was akin to its cultural and propagandistic activities. In the end it formed one single, unified, yet flexible whole that allowed a specific and genuine transnational outlook. There was but one problem: The CCF and consensus liberalism were an invitation to left-wing liberal and social democratic reformism, to the second, narrow consensus. Anti-Communism was, in the long run, certainly not enough to secure the broad multi-partisan consensus on a transnational level. As a matter of fact, the CCF during the two decades of its existence always tried to integrate conservatives into the organization, yet in vain. However active the CCF may have been, it soon became clear that consensus liberalism was far too liberal to reach conservatives on a transnational level, as they were still predominantly nationalistic in their ideological setting. But there were other, perhaps more successful ways of integrating the conservative right into the process of Westernization and thereby, indirectly, into the transnational system the Cold War had produced. The first way concerned the Roman Catholic Church in a privileged way.⁶¹ The Church was not perhaps a model specimen in democracy, but it had a European tradition of Christian democracy at its disposal. Moreover, it was strictly anti-Communist, was willing to accept economic reformism on a common basis of

60 C. West, *The American Evasion of Philosophy: A Genealogy of Pragmatism*, Madison, University of Wisconsin Press, 1989.

61 M. Hochgeschwender, *Waffenbrüderschaft auf Zeit: Der Vatikan, der US-amerikanische Katholizismus und die NATO*, in W. Kremp, B. Meyer, (eds.), *Religion und Zivilreligion im Atlantischen Bündnis*, Trier, 2001, pp. 292-306.

anti-utilitarian impulses, was transnational in a universalist manner, and it used vast instruments of cultural propaganda. Therefore, the Catholic Church was an ideal candidate for a transnationalized anti-Communist right, but only in Catholic countries. Besides, Catholicism, in the view of consensus liberals who often thought in anticlerical traditions, was in need for reform, as were the theoretically Marxist parties of the left. Despite this shortcoming, that was at least partially improved by the II. Vatican Council, Catholicism, and even more so, an ecumenical and perhaps secularized Christian democracy, were ideal partners for the consensus liberals.

The second way included ecumenism and other attempts to overcome the national limitations of the European and American protestant tradition⁶². As we still lack enough academic research to write a history of the Westernization of Protestantism during the Cold War, we necessarily have to rely on small pieces of evidence that this process was intended. One key element was the *Moral Re-Armament* (MRA) or *Caux-Movement*⁶³ of the American protestant preacher Frank Buchman that included conservative Protestants and Catholics, such as, for example, Konrad Adenauer on a strictly anti-Communist basis. Another one was the evangelical movement of Billy Graham. They both give hints about a possible role of Protestantism in the transnational conflict of the Cold War. But, as far as we can judge nowadays, Protestantism never became as important as Catholicism in rearranging European conservatism. Furthermore, the Barthian wing of Protestantism, predominantly in West Germany, remained critically about American hegemony and about anti-Communism⁶⁴, while it accepted a national-neutralist approach toward the solution of the «German question».

The third way proved to be the most successful in the long run. The European integrationist movement in itself was as diverse as the other liberalizing and westernizing efforts of the 1950s⁶⁵. It included ultra-Catholic reactionaries, like the *Abendländische Aktion*⁶⁶, the conservative Paneuropean Movement of Richard Count Coudenhove-Kalergi, and, finally, a liberal wing, the UEF. In opposition to the

62 A. Schäfer, *Neo-Evangelikalismus, amerikanische Außenpolitik und die NATO 1941-1961*, in W. Kremp, B. Meyer (eds.), *Religion und Zivilreligion*, pp. 235-55.

63 G. Leam, *On the Tail of a Comet: The Life of Frank Buchman*, Colorado Springs, Helmers & Howard Publishing, 1988.

64 Cfr. T. Sauer, *Westorientierung im deutschen Protestantismus? Vorstellungen und Tätigkeit des Kronberger Kreises*, München, Oldenbourg, 1999, pp. 25-50.

65 V. Conze, *Das Europa der Deutschen: Ideen von Europa in Deutschland zwischen Reichstradition und Westorientierung, 1920-1970*, Diss., Tübingen, 2001.

66 A. Schildt, *Zwischen Abendland und Amerika: Studien zur westdeutschen Ideenlandschaft der 50er Jahre*, München, Oldenbourg, 1999, pp. 21-82.

churches or the CCF, the integrationist movement was not based on a genuine cultural approach. It was founded on existing systems of values and ideologies and only tried to transform them into a common European framework. That explains why in the first years Roman Catholicism and, later on, consensus liberalism were so important within the European integrationist movement. Besides, economic technocratism became the major driving force of the European movement.

This was quite important, as during the formative phase of European late twentieth century modernization, between 1955 and 1968, a more consumer oriented materialism became a dominant aspect of the newly formed transatlantic, westernized culture. This development, on the one hand, diminished the impact of political asceticism, as practised by Communists and Fascists, and endangered the traditional asceticism of Catholicism and Protestantism⁶⁷. Thereby, the political-cultural constellation of the early 1950s began to vanish; Christian democracy and conservatism were transformed into more secular and more liberal ideologies. This made, on the other hand, the last successes of consensus liberalism and, therefore, of the CCF and its way of Westernization, possible⁶⁸. The Grand Coalition in West Germany, consisting of a reformed social democracy and a Christian democracy in the process of a declining Christian impact, or the Italian *apertura a sinistra* were elements of the new development, that was, in part, a result of the activities of the CCF's consensus liberals and their ideology of the 1950s. Ironically, the primacy of anti-Communism had nearly vanished, a fact the old warriors of anti-Communism had problems accepting. When the New Left, again a transnational movement that was heavily rooted in an ambiguous relationship with its liberal predecessors, arose as a new challenge⁶⁹, those Cold War liberals could only perceive a renewed Marxism. Not only did they believe that their theory about the End of Ideology⁷⁰ was empirically proven wrong, they, on a far deeper level, had the feeling that their whole life work was doomed. For them it was nearly impossible to acknowledge that the radical students of the late 1960s were the more or less legitimate heirs of the 1950s' anti-Communist left. Therefore, the CCF, and with the organization Cold War-based consensus liberalism as a whole, lost its inner momentum. It died long before

67 S. Payne, *Geschichte des Faschismus: Aufstieg und Niedergang einer europäischen Bewegung*, Berlin, Propyläen, 2001, p. 607; cfr. furthermore A. Schildt, A. Sywottek (eds.), *Modernisierung im Wiederaufbau*, Berlin, Dietz, 1993.

68 On European Reactions cfr. R.H. Pells, *Not Like Us: How Europeans Have Loved, Hated, and Transformed American Culture since World War II*, New York, Basic Books, 1997.

69 C. Leggewie, *1968-Ein transatlantisches Ereignis und seine Folgen*, in Junker et al. (eds.), *USA und Deutschland*, cit., pp. 632-43.

70 R. Hochgeschwender, *Freiheit*, cit., pp. 466-79.

the revealing of the CIA-CCF affiliation in 1966/67 blew it into pieces. The political and social implications of consensus liberalism, however, continued to have some impact on American and European societies and the weakened nation state. The Cold War had rearranged transatlantic societies, the process of Westernization, so gallantly and bluntly fought for by the CCF, had presented a new world of ideas and values to the Americans and Western Europeans. Rival ideologies had been reformed or were defeated by the process of social modernization. Therefore, the time had come for a new transnational ideology. Yet, the peak of the Cold War was already passed and with the Cold War the transnationalize impulse had to change. After 1970, neoliberal globalization efforts and the search for a more homely and easily comprehensible social formation, particularistic, secular conservative, or in the heritage of the New Left, rivalled with each other. Thus, the Cold War had been a catalyst, accelerating underlying long-term trends influenced by the over-arching process of global modernization. Transnationalization always had had an impact on the societies of the transatlantic culture. The Cold War, however, gave them a specific coherence, because of its political, cultural, and social implications. But in the late 1960s it lost its implicit force. When the coherent Cold War way of dealing with transnational problems lost its influence, a search for a new order began.

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