

I want to thank Maurizio Vaudagna for his thoughtful and thorough review, which accurately lays out my book's main arguments, overarching themes, and historiographical intentions. His careful reading also uncovered some key weak points in the work. Let me turn to his useful criticisms.

Vaudagna notes that those arguing for Americanization lay particular emphasis on mass culture from rock 'n' roll to Hollywood films and TV shows, iconic items like Coke, and youth subcultures. Here American influences do seem strongest. He rightly suggests that many other areas of consumption were more autonomous and deserve greater attention. I tried to do this in my discussion of European models of housing that were different both architecturally and in terms of ownership from American ones. An even more telling case I treated was the modern European kitchen, an interwar European invention that was built across Europe from Moscow to Manchester in the post 1945 decades and that differed substantially from its American counterpart. But more could and probably should have been done to make the point that even in the most Americanized area of European life, consumption, European patterns remained distinctive. I found two of his suggested topics particularly promising—car design and tourism practices. And a discussion of food would have shown how important intra European movements and influences were as well as how Europeanized cuisine and the food industry in the U.S. have become. While I did talk about how European influences shaped American homes and diets in the early twentieth century, I should have done more on similar movements from East to West in the late twentieth century. The America of the 1970s or 1990s was not nearly as “American” as it had been in the 1940s or 1960s, and Europe played a major part in this globalization of the U.S.

I agree entirely that much more research needs to be done on precisely which European ideas, people, businesses, and products moved from Europe to the U.S. and with what impact. This is true for both the pre World War I decades and for the period from the mid 1960s onward in terms of investments, entrepreneurs, and technologies. While work has been done on the influence of some of the most prominent interwar refugee intellectuals and artists before and after World War II, little has been done on less prominent figures and virtually nothing on the period after the 1950s. Fortunately, the German Historical Institute in Washington DC is supporting work on these topics, and Jan Logemann and I are co-editing a selection of exciting work by young scholars that was presented at a conference on *More Atlantic Crossings? European Voices and the Postwar Atlantic Community*. This will be published as a supplement to the *GHI Bulletin*. I hope it will encourage others to work in this important area.

As a historian I am much more comfortable analyzing the past than predicting the future, especially the future of Europe as an idea, an integrated economic entity, and a political project. My book is admittedly both positive and hopeful about what Vaudagna calls the “March of Europe,” and for two reasons. First, from the 1970s on Europe seemed to offer a viable alternative to an increasingly neoliberal and militarily interventionist America. Second, until 2008 both the expansion and deepening of the EU were proceeding relatively successfully. Then came the crisis, which initially put stresses on the euro but much less so on the viability of the EU. At the time I finished writing my book in mid 2011, Americans were gleefully predicting the imminent death of both, but few Europeans agreed. Since then, in the wake of the crises in Greece and Cyprus and economic stagnation and soaring unemployment across Southern Europe, Greece is considering leaving the euro, Britain plans to hold a referendum on membership in the EU, and practically everyone is angry at Germany and the European Central Bank for demanding austerity from countries already suffering acutely. Emotional identification with Europe, always thin, is now in many countries frayed or virtually non-existent. A more complex and critical history of European integration from the mid-1970s on is definitely called for, but whether such a history would have predicted the current crisis is unclear. Neither the future of Europe nor that of the American model is readily discernable today, but neither side of the Atlantic inspires optimism.

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